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Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of connections in academic promotions. We exploit
evidence from centralized evaluations in Spain, where evaluators are randomly as-
signed to promotion committees. We find that prior connections between candidates
and evaluators have a dramatic impact on candidates’ success. For instance, the
presence of a co-author or an advisor in the committee is equivalent to a standard
deviation increase in candidates’ research output. The effect of a weaker link, such
as a member of candidate’s doctoral thesis committee, is one fourth as large. The
source of the premium enjoyed by connected candidates depends on the nature of
their relationship with committee members. In the case of weak links, informa-
tional gains tend to dominate evaluation biases. Candidates promoted by a weak
link turn out to be more productive in the future relative to other promoted candi-
dates. However, consistently with the potential existence of favoritism, candidates
promoted by a strong connection exhibit a significantly worse research record both
before and after the evaluation.
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1 Introduction
Science is largely relying on a non-market reward system, based on meritocracy and
credit granted by peers (Stephan 1996). Failures in this system might have important
consequences for the overall quality of research. A potential threat is the existence of
previous connections between candidates and evaluators. Evaluators may favor connected
candidates out of nepotism or because they share a common view on which academic areas
are more valuable.1 However, the presence of acquainted evaluators might also improve
the efficiency of a selection process, as they might be better informed about candidates’
quality.
The net effect of this trade-off, the potential existence of an evaluation bias versus
the positive informational effect of connections, may vary depending on the nature of
connections and the institutional setup. The empirical evidence is relatively scarce.2 La-
band and Piette (1994) and Brogaard et al. (2012) show that, in top Economics journals,
editors take advantage of their connections with colleagues from their own institution in
order to identify and ‘capture’ high-impact papers for publication. Li (2011) finds that
the presence of related reviewers, as measured by citations, improves the quality of re-
search supported by the National Institute of Health (NIH). Whether these results hold
in other contexts or whether they apply to other types of connections remains an open
question.
In this paper we study the role of connections in academic promotions using the
exceptional evidence provided by the system of centralized evaluations that was in place
in Spain from 2002 through 2006. During this period, candidates both to full professor
and associate professor positions were evaluated by a committee at the national level.3
1As Joseph A. Schumpeter (1954) pointed out, “it is merely human nature that we overrate the
importance of our own types of research and underrate the importance of the types that appeal to
others.” (History of Economic Analysis, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1954, page 20.)
2A number of studies observe that connected candidates are more likely to be promoted. For instance,
evidence from France and Italy shows that promotion committees tend to prefer connected candidates,
conditional on their observable research production (Perotti 2002, Combes et al. 2008, De Paola and
Scoppa 2011, Durante et al. 2011). This evidence is consistent both with the existence of informational
asymmetries and an evaluation bias.
3The position of catedra´tico de universidad at a Spanish university may be considered equivalent to
the position of full professor in a U.S. university. The category of profesor titular de universidad would
be equivalent to associate professor; in Spain, the position of associate professor typically carries tenure.
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Successful candidates could then apply for a position at the university level.4 The evidence
provided by centralized competitions has several convenient features for the analysis.
First, committee members were selected out of the pool of eligible professors in the
discipline using a random lottery. Our empirical strategy exploits this random assignment
of evaluators to committees. This approach allows for the possibility that connected
candidates are better in dimensions that are observable to evaluators but not to the
econometrician. Second, conflict of interest rules were seldom implemented. As a result,
it is possible to study the effect of different types of connections between evaluators and
candidates, including very close ones such as thesis advisors, co-authors and colleagues
as well as weaker ties. Finally, the system affected a large number of researchers at
every academic discipline. In total, our database includes information on thirty thousand
candidacies evaluated by approximately one thousand committees. The size and the
breadth of the database allow us to investigate the robustness of results along a number
of dimensions.
Connections have a significant positive impact on candidates’ chances of being pro-
moted. The magnitude of the effect is increasing with the strength of the connection.
Candidates have 78% more chances of being promoted if the committee includes, by luck
of the draw, a strong connection such as their doctoral thesis advisor or a co-author; the
presence in the committee of a colleague from the same university increases candidates’
chances of success by 35%, and the presence of a weak connection, such as a professor
with whom the candidate had interacted previously at some PhD thesis defense, by 19%.
The importance of connections is commensurate with the relevance of observable research
quality, as measured by the number of publications in ISI Web of Science, received ci-
tations, and participation in thesis committees. For instance, the presence of a strong
connection in the evaluation committee is equivalent to a one standard deviation increase
in candidates’ observable quality.
The information on candidates’ research production during the five-year period fol-
4This procedure is relatively similar to promotion systems currently in place in other countries in
continental Europe. In France, professors are recruited through a centralized examination (concours
nationaux d’agre´gation). In Italy, the Moratti Law (2005) introduced a nation-wide qualification exam
for candidates to university positions (l’idoneita` nazionale).
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lowing the evaluation suggests that the source of the premium enjoyed by connected
candidates depends on the nature of their relationship with committee members. Infor-
mation asymmetries about candidates’ research quality may explain why evaluators are
more likely to promote weakly connected candidates. Candidates that were promoted
by a committee that included a weak tie turn out to be significantly more productive in
the future relative to other promoted candidates. On the contrary, candidates who were
promoted by a committee that included their thesis advisor, a co-author or a colleague
exhibit a worse research record both before and after the evaluation. In this case, eval-
uators seem to be willing to ‘sacrifice’ candidates’ research production in exchange for
getting connected candidates promoted. There are at least two possible explanations for
this behavior. Strong connections might be benefiting from cronyism. Alternatively, the
larger success rate of these candidates might reflect the existence of information asymme-
tries in some other dimension that is only observable for strongly connected evaluators,
such as candidates’ willingness to help other colleagues (Oettl 2012). However, it seems
unlikely that these information asymmetries can fully explain the large premium associ-
ated to connections. According to survey information, publications in journals covered
by ISI Web of Science were the most important factor for promotion decisions.5 Overall,
our analysis suggests that the balance between the positive informational effect of con-
nections and the potential existence of evaluation biases varies depending on the strength
of connections.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional
background. Section 3 provides details on the data and the definition of variables. In
section 4 we present the empirical evidence and we investigate possible explanations for
the effect of connections. Finally, in section 5 we summarize our results and discuss
possible policy implications.
5Survey completed by 1,294 eligible evaluators (Sierra et al. 2009).
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2 Institutional background
European countries are increasingly concerned with the efficiency of their universities.
In an attempt to strengthen meritocracy, during the last decade several countries have
reformed the organization of universities (Aghion et al. 2010). In this respect, Spain
offers an insightful case.
Before 2002, Spanish public universities had a large degree of autonomy regarding
hiring and promotion.6 This system was largely associated with inbreeding, generating
public concerns about the potential existence of favoritism.7 In order to increase meritoc-
racy, in 2002 a system of centralized competitions known as habilitacio´n was introduced
by the government.8 The new system involved two stages. First, candidates to full and
associate professor positions were required to qualify in a national competition held at
the discipline level.9 Successful candidates could then apply for a position at a given
university. The number of positions created at the national level was very limited, and
competition at the university level was largely absent. Thus, in practice, being accredited
was generally equivalent to being promoted. Notably, committee members in centralized
competitions were selected by random draw from the pool of all evaluators in the field. In
2006, the system of habilitacio´n was replaced by a system known as acreditacio´n, which
is still in place. As in the system of habilitacio´n, applicants are required to be accredited
by a national review committee. However, under the new system, committee members
are selected from the pool of professors who volunteer for the task, and there is no limit
to the number of candidates who may receive the accreditation.
In this paper we analyze centralized competitions in the Spanish public university
6As is generally the case in Europe, most university professors in Spain are based in public universities.
In Spain, approximately 88% of university professors work in a public institution (Source: Instituto
Nacional de Estad´ıstica 2010).
7According to Cruz-Castro et al. (2006) in the nineties 93% of university tenured positions were
assigned to internal candidates. Approximately 70% of these candidates had also done their PhD in the
same university.
8This motivation for the reform was expressed, among others, by Julio Iglesias de Ussel, vice-minister
for Education and Universities (newspaper El Pa´ıs, November 5th, 2001). Detailed information about
this system of centralized competitions is available at the State Bulletin (http://www.boe.es/boe/
dias/2002/08/07/pdfs/A29254-29268.pdf)
9There are nearly two hundred legally defined academic disciplines. These disciplines were created in
1984 on the basis of “the homogeneity of its object of knowledge, a common historic tradition and the
existence of a community of researchers” (R.D. 1988/84).
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system during 2002-2006. The time structure of examinations was as follows. First, uni-
versities reported the number of openings to the Ministry.10 The centralized competition
was then announced, and candidates were allowed to apply within twenty days. Once the
list of applicants was settled, committee members were selected by random draw from
the list of eligible evaluators. This list included those professors and researchers who were
working in public institutions in Spain at the time, and who were officially recognized
to have a minimum research quality in the discipline.11 Around 80% of full professors
and approximately 70% of associate professors qualified.12 The selection was carried out
by Ministry officials using a drum which contained as many balls as there were eligible
evaluators.
Each committee was composed of seven members. In exams to associate professor
positions, three evaluators were chosen from the list of eligible full professors (henceforth
FP), and four evaluators were chosen from the list of eligible associate professors (hence-
forth AP). In the case of exams to FP positions, all committee members were chosen from
the list of eligible FPs. The committee member with the longest tenure was appointed
president, and the exam was held at the university where the president was based.
Further, seven evaluators were randomly assigned to form a committee in reserve.
Their role was to replace evaluators in case somebody resigned from the committee.
Evaluators could only resign under a very restricted set of reasons, and resignations
happened very rarely: about 2% of initially assigned evaluators were replaced. There are
10Even though the number of available accreditations was equal to the total number of openings
requested by universities, these accreditations were not directly linked to university openings. Universities
that had requested a position were not forced to hire one of the candidates who were accredited in the
following competition. Universities could postpone hiring decisions, or they could hire a candidate who
had been accredited in the past. In fact, universities would often create a position once a local candidate
had been accredited.
11The random assignment of evaluators to committees was subject to some minor constraints. Not
more than one non-university researcher belonging to the Spanish Research Council (CSIC) was allowed
to be selected as a member of the evaluation committee for a given exam. Similarly, not more than one
emeritus professor was allowed to be selected as a member of a given evaluation committee. Therefore,
in exams where the population of potential evaluators contained two or more researchers, or two or more
emeritus professors, the expected committee composition should be computed taking into account this
constraint. The details on these calculations are in Appendix B.
12The research quality requirement was based on the number of sexenios recognized to each professor.
Sexenios are granted by the Spanish education authorities on the basis of applicants’ academic research
output in any non-interrupted period of a maximum of six years. Source: Comisio´n Nacional Evaluadora
de la Actividad Investigadora, Memoria de los resultados de las evaluaciones realizadas de 1989 a 2005,
2005.
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two main types of resignations. Professors were allowed to decline if they were temporarily
holding a high position in Spain’s public administration. Also, professors were to abstain
from participating in the committee if they had a very close personal connection with one
of the candidates.13 With very few exceptions, evaluators did not report such connections.
For instance, according to our own calculations, out of 832 professors who were assigned
to evaluate their own PhD students, only 22 resigned from the committee, a proportion
which is similar to the overall rate.
Competitions to FP positions had two qualifying stages. In the first stage each can-
didate presented her re´sume´. In the second stage candidates presented a piece of their
research work. Additionally, exams to AP positions had an intermediate stage, in which
candidates had to deliver a lecture on a topic from their syllabus. At each stage, pass-
ing decisions were taken on a majority basis. At the end of the process, the number of
qualified candidates could not be larger than the total number of positions.
3 Data
We use data from three different sources. First, we have collected information on all
exams to AP and FP positions that were held in Spain when the centralized system
of examinations was in place (years 2002-2006). Second, we have gathered information
on the research output of candidates and eligible evaluators from ISI Web of Science.
Third, we use information on PhD dissertations read in Spain. This data allows us to
identify individuals’ PhD alma mater and their academic networks. In Appendix A we
provide a detailed explanation on how this data was collected and how each variable was
constructed. Below we describe the final database.
13The law considers three main cases: (i) the evaluator has a personal interest in the matter, (ii)
there is some kinship relationship, (iii) there exists a well-known friendship (or enmity). Ley de Pro-
cedimiento Administrativo 30/1992, article 28, retrieved on February 7th 2012 at http://www.boe.es/
aeboe/consultas/bases_datos/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1992-26318. We thank Anxo Sa´nchez for provid-
ing us this reference.
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3.1 Exams
The dataset includes information on 967 exams, of which 465 are exams to AP positions
and 502 are exams to FP positions. Table 1 provides descriptive information on the
characteristics of these exams. There were on average five positions available per exam
in AP exams, and three positions per exam in FP exams. The level of competition
was similar; in both types of exams there were approximately ten candidates for every
position. Practically all positions offered were filled.
3.2 Evaluators
In total, in the period we study there were 7,963 eligible FPs and 21,979 eligible APs. As
shown in Table 2, the average eligible FP is 53 years old; eight years older than the average
eligible AP. Women constitute 14% of eligible FPs and 35% of APs. As expected, eligible
FPs tend to have a larger research record than APs. On average, FPs have nine (single-
authored equivalent) ISI publications and APs have five.14 Publications of both FP and
AP professors receive around 8 citations each. Eligible FPs have supervised on average
five doctoral students, while the average eligible AP has supervised only one student.
Similarly, FPs have participated in almost five times more PhD thesis committees than
APs, 25 and 5 respectively.
3.3 Candidates
During the period of study there were 13,612 applications to FP positions, and 18,138
applications to AP positions. On average, candidates applied twice, either because they
failed the first time, or because they tried to simultaneously obtain a position in several
related disciplines. As shown in Table 2, candidates to FP positions tend to be older,
male, and to exhibit a better research record than candidates to AP positions. Appli-
cants to FP positions have on average advised two students, and have participated in
seven dissertation committees, whereas applicants to AP positions have not yet actively
14In what follows we divide publications by the number of co-authors. For instance, two publications
with two co-authors are equivalent to one single-authored publication.
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participated in the direction of doctoral students, and only a few of them have taken part
in PhD committees. Given that there are relatively large differences across positions and
across disciplines in the propensity to publish, cite, participate in dissertations, and time
necessary to progress in the career, in what follows we normalize research indicators and
age to have zero mean and unit standard deviation for candidates within each exam.
In Table 3 we report the correlation between the main characteristics of candidates,
pooling together information from exams to FP and AP positions.15 We observe that
more prolific candidates tend also to have higher research quality, as measured by the
number of citations received (Table 3, block B-B). Well-published candidates are also
more likely to participate in students’ supervision and evaluation. On average, older
candidates do not have a better publication record, but they have participated more
extensively in students’ supervision and evaluation. There are no gender differences in
terms of publications and citations, but women are significantly less likely to advise
doctoral students or participate in dissertation committees.
3.4 Links between evaluators and candidates
We consider several types of connections between candidates and evaluators. As Gra-
novetter (1973) points out, the strength of an interpersonal tie should be related to “the
amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the re-
ciprocal services which characterize the tie”. First, we focus on the strongest academic
connections: advisors and co-authors. As shown in Table 4, approximately 13% of appli-
cants to a FP positions happened to be evaluated by one of these strong links. In exams
to AP positions, they affected 8% of candidates. Second, we investigate institutional
connections. In exams to FP positions 28% of candidates had a colleague from their uni-
versity (who was not an advisor or a co-author) sitting in the evaluation committee. In
exams to AP positions, 25% of candidates were evaluated by a committee that included
an evaluator who was based in candidates’ alma mater.16 Third, we use information on
15Results are very similar if we disaggregate the table by position.
16Unfortunately we cannot observe the affiliation of candidates to AP positions at the time of the exam,
we only observe the institution where they obtained their PhD. Given the low geographical mobility of
Spanish professors at this stage (Cruz-Castro et al. 2006), it seems reasonable to presume that the large
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candidates’ and evaluators’ participation in PhD thesis committees. We consider several
types of interactions: (i) the evaluator was a member of candidate’s thesis committee,
(ii) the evaluator has invited the candidate to sit on the thesis committee of one of her
students (or vice versa) and (iii) the evaluator and the candidate participated in the same
thesis committee. We denominate these links weak ties. Weak ties are relatively more
frequent in exams to FP positions, where approximately 34% of candidates are evalu-
ated by a weak link. In exams to AP positions, only 7% of candidates have a weak tie
with a committee member. Finally, we define several indicators of indirect links between
candidates and evaluators: the evaluator and the candidate have either (i) a common
advisor, (ii) a common co-author or (iii) a common thesis committee member. To stress
that these links do not necessarily imply professional interaction or awareness of each
other’s research, we denominate them indirect ties. These indirect ties are also relatively
frequent, affecting about a fifth of candidates.
4 Empirical analysis
Our empirical analysis is structured as follows. First, we estimate the (causal) effect of
committees’ composition on applicants’ chances of being promoted. In order to get a
better understanding of the magnitude of the effect, we also compare the effect of con-
nections on promotions with the effect of observable research quality. Second, we explore
the effect of connections across different types of disciplines, departments, candidates and
evaluators. Finally, we investigate the source of the premium associated to connections.
In particular, using information on candidates’ future research production, we consider
the possibility that evaluators might be more accurate at assessing the research potential
of candidates they are acquainted with.
majority of candidates to AP positions were still based in their alma mater at the time of the evaluation.
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4.1 The (causal) effect of connections on promotions
As shown in Table 4, candidates’ chances of success are significantly larger when they
have some connection in the evaluation committee. In exams to FP positions, candidates
who are evaluated by their thesis advisor or co-author are three times more likely to be
promoted than candidates who had no connections in the committee. Candidates with
colleagues or weak connections among evaluators have more than twice larger chances of
success relatively to unconnected candidates. Indirect connections are also associated to
larger chances of success, although the premium is not as high as in the case of direct
connections. The pattern is very similar in exams to AP positions.
Naturally, this descriptive evidence might be suggestive about the potential relevance
of connections, but it has no causal interpretation. The larger success rate of connected
candidates might simply reflect their higher quality (see Table 3, block C-B). In order
to identify the causal effect of having a connection in the committee, we compare the
outcomes of candidates with a similar expected committee composition but who, as a
consequence of the realizations of random draws, are evaluated by committees with dif-
ferent composition. For instance, one may think about the case of two candidates who
apply for a promotion, each one has a connection in the set of eligible evaluators, but
only one of these two connected evaluators happens to be (randomly) assigned to the
evaluation committee.
As pointed out in section 2, approximately 2% of evaluators drawn in the lottery
where replaced. As well, according to anecdotal evidence, some professors did not attend
the exam (or part of it) without a proper justification. In what follows, we measure
committee composition using the outcome of the initial random draw, which might be
slightly different from the committee composition that ends up evaluating candidates.
Therefore, our estimates below provide the intention-to-treat effect.
The following equation describes the relationship between the candidates’ probability
of being promoted and the (random) number of connections in the evaluation committee:
yie = β0 + β1(cie − µie) + ie (1)
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where yie indicates whether individual i qualified in exam e and (cie − µie) is the shock
to committee composition, i.e., the difference between the actual (cie) and the expected
number of connections (µie) of candidate i. Note that β0 indicates the average success
rate.
The key assumption in our identification strategy is that the selection of committee
members was random. More formally,
E[(cie − µie) · ie] = 0 (2)
If this condition is satisfied, β1 can be interpreted as the causal effect of an additional
connection among evaluators on candidates’ probability of success.
The empirical evidence is consistent with the assignment indeed being random. As
shown in Table 3, there is no significant difference between the expected committee
composition and the mean of the actual realization of the draw. As well, there is no rela-
tionship between the magnitude of the shocks to committee composition and candidates’
characteristics (Table 3, blocks D-B and D-C).
Table 5 presents the estimation results for equation (1). Standard errors are clustered
at the exam level, reflecting the fact that the shocks received by candidates in the same
examination are not independent. We report results for the four aggregate sets of con-
nections defined earlier: strong, institutional, weak and indirect connections.17 Strong
connections lead to a 9 percentage points increase in applicants’ likelihood of success
(column 1). This is equivalent to a 78% increase relative to the average success rate
(about 11% of candidates are promoted). Institutional and weak connections with com-
mittee members also have a significant positive effect. They increase candidates’ chances
of success by 4 and 2 percentage points respectively (approximately a 35% and a 19%
increase). The effect of indirect connections is not statistically different from zero.
Weak ties are relatively more important in exams to AP positions. The importance
of other connections is stable over the academic career (columns 2 and 3). Next, as a
robustness check, in column 4 we control for exam fixed effects. As expected, results are
17In Appendix A we report results at a disaggregated level.
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unchanged. We also use an alternative identification strategy to estimate the effect of
committee composition. Specifically, given that many individuals applied several times
for promotion, we use a fixed-effects strategy. In other words, we compare the evaluations
given to the same individual by different promotion committees. Note that this strategy
is less efficient, since it does not exploit all possible variation in the data. Its internal
validity is also more limited, as it considers only those individuals who participated in
examinations more than once. Nevertheless, the estimates are statistically similar to the
baseline estimation (column 5 vs. column 1). As an additional robustness check, we
replicate the analysis for the subsample of candidates who obtained their PhD in Spain.
The estimated coefficients are similar to the ones obtained for the whole sample (column 6
vs. column 1).
4.2 The role of candidates’ quality
The results above suggest that connections have a strong effect on promotion decisions.
In order to get a better understanding of the magnitude of these effects, we examine the
relevance of a number of observable individual characteristics that proxy for candidates’
quality. In particular, we estimate the effect of candidates’ publications, the average
number of citations per publication, the number of PhD students advised, and the number
of participations in PhD thesis committees. We also control for age since, conditional on
research output, younger candidates might have a larger potential. These variables are
all normalized at the exam level.
The effect of observable research quality is commensurate with the effect of connec-
tions. Candidates who, conditional on age, score one standard deviation more than
average in each one of these four observable dimensions of research quality have approx-
imately 7 percentage points higher chances of success (Table 5, column 7). We also
observe that, conditional on their research output, older candidates have lower chances
of promotion.
Our analysis may be subject to a measurement error induced by homonymity. This
might create an attenuation bias in our estimates for variables based on publications
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data. Given that homonymity is expected to be less of a problem for individuals with
less common surnames, we also perform the analysis on the subsample of individuals with
surnames that are less frequent than the median surname (column 8). The estimates of
some coefficients are slightly larger. In this subsample, an increase of one standard
deviation in all research indicators is associated with 10 percentage points higher chances
of success. The presence of an advisor or a co-author in the committee has also a slightly
larger impact. It increases candidates’ chances of being promoted by 12 percentage points.
The effect of colleagues and weak connections remains the same.
4.3 Heterogeneity analysis
Next we analyze whether the effect of connections varies depending on the characteristics
of disciplines, universities, candidates and evaluators.
4.3.1 Disciplines
The Spanish academic profession is formally divided into nearly two hundred disciplines.
We divide disciplines into seven broad groups: Physics and Mathematics, Engineering,
Chemistry and Biology, Medicine, Social Sciences, Humanities, and Law. The upper
panel of Table 6 shows some descriptive information by disciplinary group. Candidates’
propensity to publish in journals indexed by ISI Web of Science varies across groups.
In Law, candidates have almost no publications, suggesting that, at least in Spanish
academia, ISI journals are not a common outlet for research in this disciplinary group.
Candidates in the Social Sciences and Humanities have published less than one article
(adjusted by the number of co-authors), whereas candidates in the rest of disciplines have
published about five to nine articles.
The lower panel provides information on the impact of candidates’ observable research
quality and connections on their probability of being promoted. Indicators of research
quality and connections tend to have a similar effect on candidates’ chances of being
promoted across all groups of disciplines. The only exception is observed in Law, where
ISI publications and participation in dissertations do not seem to matter for promotion
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and the impact of having direct connections in the committee is twice as large as in the
average discipline.
The size of the discipline may affect the prevalence of connections and also its impact.
We divide observations in two groups according to the median number of tenured profes-
sors working in the discipline. Candidates in smaller disciplines have significantly more
ties (upper panel of Table 7, columns 1-3). The expected number of strong connections
in the committee is 56% larger (0.14 vs. 0.09), the number of colleagues is 40% larger
(0.42 vs. 0.30) and the number of weak ties is twice as large (0.33 vs. 0.15). We also ob-
serve that strong connections are significantly more helpful in small disciplines, whereas
the effect of colleagues and weak ties is statistically similar across disciplines of different
size. Summing up, in small disciplines connections tend to be more abundant and more
effective.
4.3.2 Department size
We explore whether the relevance of connections depends on the size of departments. The
upper panel of Table 7, columns 4-6, provides information disaggregated for candidates
whose expected number of colleagues in the committee was respectively below and above
the median. Not surprisingly, candidates from larger departments tend to have more
colleagues in the committee. They expect to have 0.65 colleagues in the evaluation
committee, while the figure is eight times lower for candidates from smaller departments.
Candidates from larger departments also tend to have a higher number of strong, weak
and indirect ties. On the other hand, candidates from small departments benefit relatively
more from the presence of colleagues in the committee. Their probability of success
increases by 7 percentage points, twice as much as the effect for large departments.
In total, candidates from large departments gain more from institutional connections,
as their relative disadvantage in terms of the magnitude of the impact is more than
compensated by their advantage in the expected number of colleagues in committees.
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4.3.3 Candidates’ characteristics
Evaluators might feel more willing and more legitimized to support connected candidates
of high quality. We proxy candidates’ quality using a factor score, which is computed as
a linear combination of publications, citations per publication, PhD theses advised, PhD
committees and age, weighted by the estimated importance of each factor for promotion
(Table 6). This factor score is normalized to have zero mean and unit standard deviation
for all candidates in each exam.
Candidates of higher quality tend to have more professional connections but fewer
institutional ones (lower panel of Table 7, columns 1-3). Better candidates benefit signif-
icantly more from their connections than candidates with a weaker research record. This
is particularly true in the case of weak connections.
We also examine the role of candidates’ gender. The lack of appropriate academic
networks has been identified as one of the potential causes of women’s failure to advance
in their academic career (Blau et al. 2010). The evidence is consistent with this view. As
shown in the middle panel of Table 7, columns 4-6, female candidates have fewer connec-
tions. Moreover, they benefit significantly less from the presence of strong connections in
the evaluation committee.
4.3.4 Evaluators’ characteristics
The importance of connections might also depend on evaluators’ characteristics. Better
researchers might be more committed to meritocratic evaluation. Alternatively, they
might also be better able to impose their own evaluation criteria, being meritocratic or
less so. In the latter case, better researchers might be relatively more effective in getting
their connections promoted. We split connections in two groups according to whether
the research quality of connected evaluators is below or above the average. The lower
panel of Table 7, columns 1-3, reports the results of this analysis. All evaluators tend to
overrate their connections in a similar way, independently of their research quality.
We also examine the effect of evaluators’ gender. Male evaluators are significantly
more effective at helping their former PhD students and their co-authors. The effect of
16
weak links and colleagues is similar for both genders.
4.4 Why do evaluators overrate connected candidates?
There are several possible explanations for the positive effect of connections on promo-
tion decisions. The evidence is consistent with the existence of favoritism, where personal
relationships between candidates and evaluators lead to subjective evaluations. However,
this is not the only possible explanation. Professors may differ in their criteria about
which dimensions are more valuable. If professors are segregated across universities or
professional networks according to their tastes, this might explain why evaluators prefer
candidates they are acquainted with. Information asymmetries might also mediate the
effect of connections. In a tournament where only a few candidates can be promoted,
evaluators will optimally tend to select candidates whose quality they can observe more
accurately (Cornell and Welch 1996). Evaluators may be better informed about the
quality of acquainted candidates in dimensions that are not easily observable for other
evaluators. Evaluators acquainted with candidates may be better informed about candi-
dates’ research pipeline, or about their contribution in co-authored papers. This might
be particularly relevant for junior authors applying for AP positions. Information asym-
metries may also be relevant in other dimensions. For instance, in exams to AP positions
candidates were evaluated on their teaching quality. Evaluators from the same institution
may have better information on this dimension.
While we cannot observe candidates’ teaching quality, we can investigate the potential
existence of information asymmetries in research. Using information on candidates’ future
research production, we examine whether evaluators select acquainted candidates with a
stronger research potential, maybe compensating for their weaker publication record at
the moment of the examination. Specifically, we estimate the following model:
qtie = β0 + β1(cie − µie) + ie, t = {pre-exam, post-exam} (3)
where qtie stands for promoted candidates’ observable quality in period t. Pre-exam qual-
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ity includes information on dissertations and publications obtained before the evaluation
took place. Post-exam quality corresponds to the five-year period following the evalua-
tion. Again, quality is measured using a factor score that weighs publications, citations,
participation in theses committees, and age based on the estimated contribution of each
factor to promotion decisions (as reported in Table 6).
This analysis is reported in Table 8. Results differ depending on the nature of the
connection. The evidence suggests that information asymmetries regarding candidates’
research quality cannot justify the premium enjoyed by candidates who were evaluated
by a strong professional connection or a colleague. These candidates tend to be signifi-
cantly less productive, both before and after the evaluation, relative to other promoted
candidates (columns 1 and 4).
However, in the case of weak ties the informational component seems to dominate any
potential evaluation bias. Candidates who were promoted by a weak tie turn out to be
more productive in the five-year period following the examination than other promoted
candidates, although this effect is only marginally significant at standard levels. Given
that information asymmetries about candidates’ research potential are more likely to
be present at earlier stages of the career, we analyze separately promotions to AP and
FP positions. As expected, the informational contribution of weak ties is particularly
large in AP exams. An additional weak tie is associated to future research quality being
0.25 standard deviations higher, an effect that is very significant both in statistical and
economic terms (column 6).
5 Conclusions
The selection of evaluators is subject to a well-known dilemma. Evaluators who are
acquainted with candidates may have superior information about their quality. Unfortu-
nately, their criteria might also be biased. Which of the two effects dominates may vary
depending on the nature of their relationship, on the extent of information asymmetries
and on the institutional framework.
18
In this paper we analyze the role of connections in the context of academic promotions
in Spain. We focus on the period between 2002 and 2006, when a system of centralized
competitions with random assignment of evaluators to committees was in place. We
find that connections improve significantly candidates’ chances of chances of success both
in exams to associate professor positions and full professor positions. Connections affect
promotion decisions in all scientific disciplines, but their effect is larger in small disciplines
and for relatively better candidates. Their impact is comparable to observable research
quality. For instance, the presence in the committee of a thesis advisor or a co-author
is equivalent to a one standard deviation increase in candidate’s number of publications,
citations received, PhD students advised and participations in doctoral committees.
We test for the robustness of our results along several dimensions, including candi-
dates’ gender and quality. Men tend to be more connected and they also profit more
from strong connections.18 Candidates with a relatively modest research profile benefit
less from connections, particularly from weak ones.
The source of the premium associated to connections varies depending on the nature of
the link. Among weak connections, the informational content of links dominates potential
evaluation biases. Candidates who were promoted by a weak link, such as an evaluator
who had participated in their thesis committee, turn out to be relatively more productive
in the five-year period following the evaluation. On the contrary, candidates promoted
by a strong professional or institutional connection are relatively less productive both
before and after the evaluation, at least in terms of their observable research productivity.
Potentially there might be information asymmetries in some other relevant dimension that
is unobservable both to unconnected evaluators and to econometricians. However, the
importance of this dimension and the scale of information asymmetries would have to be
(perhaps unrealistically) large in order to fully explain the observed premium associated
to strong and institutional connections. Alternatively, these candidates may be enjoying
a preferential treatment.
18The lack of effective networks may be contributing to the lack of women in the upper levels of
academia. In a companion paper we study in detail how committees’ composition affect female professors’
academic careers (Zinovyeva and Bagues 2011).
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In sum, the evidence suggests that there might be an optimal distance between eval-
uators and candidates. Weakly connected evaluators seem to be better informed about
candidates’ quality than evaluators who had no previous contact with candidates. More-
over, they appear to be less biased than strongly connected evaluators. Our results also
indicate that this optimal distance may vary depending on the institutional framework.
For instance, while Laband and Piette (1994) and Brogaard et al. (2012) find that ed-
itors use personal associations with colleagues in their departments in order to improve
selection decisions, in Spain the presence of colleagues in promotion committees tends to
decrease the research quality of promoted candidates.
Our analysis suggests that the introduction of centralized promotion examinations
with random assignment of evaluators to committees per se does not eliminate the prob-
lem of favoritism. If anything, it introduces an element of randomness relative to who
benefits from connections and who gets ultimately promoted. It also favors candidates
from universities with relatively many senior researchers, which might be detrimental for
the growth prospects of young departments. According to our findings, strong conflicts of
interest should be prevented. If necessary, disciplines should be legally defined in such a
way that they are large enough to allow for the implementation of the conflict of interest
rules. At the same time, the presence of external evaluators who are weakly acquainted
with the candidate may improve the quality of selection. Our work might be also inter-
preted as additional evidence in favor of a radical change in the way higher education is
organized in continental Europe. The analysis of Aghion et al. (2010) suggests that a
combination of competition and autonomy would make European universities more pro-
ductive. According to this view, Europe needs to move from a system of rules to one of
incentives, whereby it is in the self-interest of universities to appoint and promote the
most productive individuals (Perotti 2002). Our analysis does not provide an answer
about which of these alternatives, more rules or incentives, would yield better outcomes.
Nevertheless, it illustrates the limitations of a system of centralized competitions where
evaluators (and universities) do not internalize the consequences of their decisions.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics – Examinations
1 2 3 4
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Full professor exams
Positions per exam 2.92 1.78 1 12
Candidates per exam 27.12 17.99 3 132
Proportion of positions filled 0.98 0.09 0 1
Number of exams 502
Associate professor exams
Positions per exam 4.74 4.71 1 25
Candidates per exam 39.01 34.80 3 270
Proportion of positions filled 0.96 0.15 0 1
Number of exams 465
Table 2: Descriptive statistics – Eligible evaluators and candidates
1 2 3 4
Eligible evaluators Candidates
Full Associate Full Associate
professor professor professor professor
Age 52.91 44.98 46.39 37.45
(6.41) (7.82) (6.50) (6.55)
Female 0.14 0.35 0.27 0.40
(0.35) (0.48) (0.44) (0.49)
Publications, weighted by co-authors 9.01 4.80 5.46 3.03
(12.74) (7.40) (7.65) (5.74)
Citations per publication 8.13 7.56 7.67 6.51
(9.94) (11.62) (12.33) (13.38)
PhD students advised 5.19 1.25 2.01 0.24
(5.33) (2.15) (2.74) (0.90)
PhD committees 25.18 5.08 7.25 0.89
(24.48) (7.36) (8.66) (2.56)
Number of observations 49199 61052 13612 18138
Number of individuals 7963 21979 6545 10039





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Success rate, by committee composition
1 2 3 4
FP exams AP exams
Proportion, Success Proportion, Success
% rate, % % rate, %
No connection 33 6 50 9
At least one connection: 67 13 50 15
- Co-author/PhD advisor 13 18 8 23
- Same university 28 15 25 16
- Weak tie 34 15 7 19
- Indirect tie 21 11 24 12
Notes: Columns 1 and 3 indicate the percentage of candidates that has a
certain type of connection in the evaluation committee. Columns 2 and 4
provide information about their success rate. FP exams and AP exams stand
for exams to Full and Associate Professor positions respectively. Candidates’
average success rate is 11% in FP exams and 12% in AP exams.
Table 5: The effect of connections on candidates’ success
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8





Connections in committee (shock):
- Co-author/PhD advisor 0.088*** 0.082*** 0.094*** 0.092*** 0.074*** 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.118***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012)
- Same university 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.025*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.040***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
- Weak tie 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.041*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
- Indirect tie -0.001 0.004 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Quality indicators (normalized):
- Publications 0.023*** 0.044***
(0.002) (0.004)
- Citations per publication 0.012*** 0.016***
(0.002) (0.003)
- PhD theses advised 0.016*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.003)
- PhD committees 0.021*** 0.023***
(0.002) (0.003)
- Age -0.019*** -0.019***
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.113*** 0.106*** 0.118*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.128***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Exam dummies Yes
Individual dummies Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.200 0.011 0.030 0.043
Number of observations 31750 13612 18138 31750 31750 24638 31750 16168
Notes: OLS estimates, standard errors clustered by exam are reported in parentheses. Coefficients indicate the percentage-point
increase in the success rate associated to a (random) increase in the number of connected evaluators (in a seven-member committee).
FP exams and AP exams stand for exams to Full and Associate Professor positions respectively. Column 6 only includes candidates
who did their PhD in Spain. Quality measures are normalized for candidates in the same exam. The subsample of individuals with
“less frequent surnames” includes individuals whose paternal and maternal surname have a frequency inferior to 100,000 (source:
Spanish Statistical Institute).
* – p-value<0.10, ** – p-value<0.05, *** – p-value<0.01.
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Table 6: The effect of connections on candidates’ success, by disciplinary group
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Disciplinary group:
Physics Engineering Chemistry Medicine Social Humanities Law
and Math and Biology Sciences
Means
Connections in committee:
- Co-author/PhD advisor 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.30 0.05 0.04 0.04
- Same university 0.28 0.60 0.25 0.32 0.36 0.47 0.19
- Weak tie 0.13 0.21 0.20 0.32 0.23 0.33 0.30
- Indirect tie 0.23 0.32 0.44 0.66 0.13 0.10 0.31
Quality indicators (non-normalized):
- Publications 6.08 5.55 8.88 7.01 0.84 0.55 0.13
- Citations per publication 8.00 7.22 16.67 14.14 3.60 0.87 0.58
- PhD theses advised 0.71 0.79 1.57 2.28 0.69 0.79 0.27
- PhD committees 2.11 2.31 5.38 7.65 2.75 3.81 1.44
- Age 38.54 38.80 42.87 45.38 40.16 43.20 39.51
Effect on success
Connections in committee (shock):
- Co-author/PhD advisor 0.099*** 0.104*** 0.047*** 0.072*** 0.092*** 0.142*** 0.213***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) (0.032) (0.030) (0.039)
- Same university 0.022** 0.019** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.032** 0.044*** 0.106***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.015)
- Weak tie 0.023 0.015 0.029** 0.027* 0.007 0.027** 0.014
(0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010)
- Indirect tie 0.001 -0.005 0.009 -0.003 -0.004 0.010 -0.012
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.018) (0.011)
Quality indicators (normalized):
- Publications 0.026*** 0.018*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.036*** 0.027*** 0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
- Citations per publication 0.018*** 0.006 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.011* 0.006 -0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
- PhD theses advised 0.016*** 0.010* 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.005 0.018** 0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
- PhD committees 0.013*** 0.017** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.013**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
- Age -0.014*** -0.033*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.010** -0.026***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.089*** 0.118*** 0.125*** 0.103*** 0.115*** 0.141*** 0.087***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Adjusted R-squared 0.033 0.027 0.031 0.046 0.034 0.030 0.051
Number of observations 5227 4596 4023 4120 4073 6254 3457
Note: The upper panel provides the mean values of the corresponding variables. The lower panel reports OLS estimates, standard
errors clustered by exam are reported in parentheses. Quality measures are normalized for candidates in the same exam. * –
p-value<0.10, ** – p-value<0.05, *** – p-value<0.01.
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Table 7: Heterogeneity analysis
1 2 3 4 5 6
Discipline size: Department size:
≤ median >median Difference ≤ median >median Difference
Means
Connections in committee:
- Co-author/PhD advisor 0.14 0.09 0.05*** 0.08 0.15 -0.07***
- Same university 0.42 0.30 0.11*** 0.08 0.65 -0.57***
- Weak tie 0.33 0.15 0.18*** 0.22 0.27 -0.04***
- Indirect tie 0.29 0.31 -0.02*** 0.27 0.32 -0.05***
Effect on success
Connections in committee (shock):
- Co-author/PhD advisor 0.106*** 0.062*** 0.043*** 0.079*** 0.093*** -0.014
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.016)
- Same university 0.042*** 0.036*** 0.007 0.069*** 0.036*** 0.032***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011)
- Weak tie 0.021*** 0.022*** -0.001 0.025*** 0.018*** 0.008
(0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
- Indirect tie -0.003 -0.000 0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Constant 0.129*** 0.096*** 0.032*** 0.096*** 0.130*** -0.034***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Number of observations 16153 15597 15876 15874
Quality of candidates: Gender of candidates:
≤median ≥median Difference Male Female Difference
Means
Connections in committee:
- Coauthor/PhD advisor 0.09 0.14 -0.05*** 0.12 0.10 0.02***
- Same university 0.38 0.34 0.04*** 0.37 0.34 0.03***
- Weak tie 0.19 0.30 -0.11*** 0.27 0.21 0.06***
- Indirect tie 0.25 0.34 -0.09*** 0.30 0.29 0.01
Effect on success
Connections in committee (shock):
- Coauthor/PhD advisor 0.073*** 0.101*** -0.027* 0.099*** 0.064*** 0.034**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (0.013) (0.015)
- Same university 0.034*** 0.049*** -0.015* 0.038*** 0.043*** -0.006
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
- Weak tie 0.011* 0.028*** -0.017* 0.023*** 0.017* 0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011)
- Indirect tie -0.004 0.002 -0.006 0.000 -0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009)
Constant 0.077*** 0.151*** -0.074*** 0.117*** 0.106*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Number of observations 16220 15530 20901 10849
Quality of connected evaluators: Gender of connected evaluators:
≤median ≥median Difference Male Female Difference
Effect on success
Connections in committee (shock):
- Coauthor/PhD advisor 0.090*** 0.081*** 0.009 0.095*** 0.033* 0.062***
(0.013) (0.009) (0.016) (0.008) (0.019) (0.021)
- Same university 0.039*** 0.031*** 0.008 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.010) (0.011)
- Weak tie 0.015* 0.020*** -0.005 0.019*** 0.030** -0.011
(0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.014) (0.015)
- Indirect tie -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 0.000 -0.012 0.012
(0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.011)
Constant 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.000 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Number of observations 31750 31750 31750 31750
Notes: The panel “Means” provides information on the mean of the corresponding variables. The panel “Effect on suc-
cess” reports OLS estimates, standard errors clustered by exam are in parentheses. “Quality” is a factor score computed
as a linear combination of (normalized) publications, citations per publication, PhD theses advised, participation in PhD
committees and age, weighted by the estimated importance of each factor for promotion in the corresponding disciplinary
group, as reported in Table 6. By construction, the mean of candidates’ “quality” is zero; variance is normalized to one.
* – p-value<0.10, ** – p-value<0.05, *** – p-value<0.01.
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Table 8: Quality of promoted candidates
1 2 3 4 5 6
Pre-exam quality Post-exam quality
All FP exams AP exams All FP exams AP exams
Connections in committee (shock):
- Co-author/PhD advisor -0.070* -0.075 -0.076 -0.088** 0.002 -0.160***
(0.040) (0.062) (0.053) (0.043) (0.066) (0.056)
- Same university -0.066** -0.072 -0.067* -0.092*** -0.062 -0.113**
(0.030) (0.048) (0.038) (0.033) (0.048) (0.045)
- Weak tie 0.026 -0.021 0.141* 0.071* 0.013 0.251***
(0.037) (0.042) (0.076) (0.036) (0.041) (0.073)
- Indirect tie 0.022 -0.062 0.060 -0.013 -0.020 -0.009
(0.038) (0.064) (0.047) (0.038) (0.073) (0.044)
Constant 0.417*** 0.523*** 0.345*** 0.458*** 0.485*** 0.438***
(0.018) (0.027) (0.023) (0.017) (0.026) (0.022)
Adjusted R-squared 0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.011
Number of observations 3573 1446 2127 3573 1446 2127
Notes: OLS estimates, standard errors clustered by exam are reported in parentheses. “Quality” is a factor score
computed as a linear combination of (normalized) publications, citations per publication, PhD theses advised,
participation in PhD committees and age, weighted by the estimated importance of each factor for promotion in
the corresponding disciplinary group, as reported in Table 6. By construction, the mean of candidates’ “quality”
is zero; variance is normalized to one. “Pre-exam quality” includes information on dissertations and publications
obtained before or during the year when the evaluation took place. “Post-exam quality” corresponds to the
five-year period following the evaluation.
* – p-value<0.10, ** – p-value<0.05, *** – p-value<0.01.
Table A1: The role of connections, by type of connection
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Means The effect of connections Pre-exam quality of Post-exam quality of
on candidates’ success promoted candidates promoted candidates
All FP AP All FP AP All FP AP All FP AP
Strong connection:
- PhD advisor 3 3 3 0.141*** 0.098*** 0.173*** -0.186*** -0.190 -0.156** -0.074 0.015 -0.102
(0.014) (0.020) (0.019) (0.065) (0.128) (0.074) (0.073) (0.153) (0.080)
- Co-author 8 10 6 0.065*** 0.077*** 0.051*** -0.005 -0.036 -0.015 -0.100* -0.009 -0.206***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.051) (0.069) (0.075) (0.052) (0.073) (0.073)
Institutional connection:
- Same university 26 28 25 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.041*** -0.065** -0.070 -0.069* -0.090*** -0.062 -0.115**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.030) (0.048) (0.038) (0.033) (0.049) (0.044)
Weak tie:
- PhD thesis committee
member
7 9 5 0.029*** 0.021** 0.042*** 0.002 -0.039 0.032 0.130** 0.100 0.148*
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.059) (0.086) (0.081) (0.060) (0.085) (0.084)
- Link by invitation 4 8 0.5 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.020 0.015 -0.057 0.427 0.002 -0.062 0.564**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.046) (0.076) (0.071) (0.324) (0.070) (0.068) (0.281)
- Same PhD thesis committee 10 21 2 0.009 0.006 0.046* 0.049 0.010 0.326* 0.069 0.025 0.440***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.025) (0.054) (0.055) (0.172) (0.050) (0.053) (0.146)
Indirect tie:
- Same PhD advisor 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.048 0.089 0.023 -0.338 -1.291*** 0.286 -0.456* -0.673 -0.331
(0.046) (0.086) (0.053) (0.334) (0.346) (0.479) (0.271) (0.426) (0.393)
- Same co-author 14 12 15 -0.002 0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.096 0.035 -0.068 -0.143 -0.032
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.052) (0.088) (0.065) (0.052) (0.103) (0.060)
- Same PhD thesis committee
member
8 8 9 0.001 0.005 -0.002 0.084 0.040 0.088 0.086 0.210** 0.032
(0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.054) (0.101) (0.063) (0.056) (0.104) (0.065)
Constant 0.113*** 0.106*** 0.118*** 0.419*** 0.525*** 0.347*** 0.457*** 0.484*** 0.436***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.018) (0.027) (0.023) (0.017) (0.026) (0.022)
Adjusted R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.012
Number of observations 31750 13612 18138 3573 1446 2127 3573 1446 2127
Notes: Columns 1-3 provide information on the means of the corresponding variables. Columns 4-12 report OLS estimates, standard errors clustered by exam are
reported in parentheses. Columns 4-6 provide information from an analysis similar to the one reported in Table 5. Columns 7-12 replicate the analysis in Table 8.
* – p-value<0.10, ** – p-value<0.05, *** – p-value<0.01.
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Appendix A: Data
We have collected information from three different sources: (i) information on centralized
competitions from the Ministry of Research and Science, (ii) individual research produc-
tion from ISI Web of Science and (iii) information on doctoral dissertations from TESEO
database. Below we describe the process of data collection in detail.
Ministry of Research and Science The system of centralized competitions known
as ‘habilitacio´n’ was in place between 2002 and 2006. Information on candidates’ and
evaluators’ first name, last name and id number was retrieved from the website of the
Ministry of Research and Science in July 2009 (http://www.micinn.es). In total, 1016
exams took place, around five per discipline. We restrict the sample in several ways.
We exclude exams where the number of available positions was larger or equal than the
number of candidates (two exams in Basque Philology and one exam in Textile and Paper
Engineering) and disciplines where the number of potential evaluators was not big enough
to form a committee (46 exams).19 The final database includes 967 exams.
The actual age of individuals is not observable. Instead, we exploit the fact that
Spanish ID numbers contain information on their issue date to construct a proxy for the
age of native individuals on the basis of his/her national ID number. In Spain police
stations are given a range of numbers that they then assign to individuals in a sequential
manner. Since it is compulsory for all Spaniards to have an ID number by age 14, two
Spaniards with similar ID numbers are likely to be of the same age (and geographical
origin).20 In order to perform the assignment, we first use registry information on the date
of birth and ID numbers of 1.8 million individuals in order to create a correspondence
19In theses cases, unfilled seats in the committee were filled with professors from related disciplines.
20There are a number of exceptions. For instance, this methodology will fail to identify the age of
those individuals who obtained their nationality when they were older than 14. This could be a case
of immigrants coming to Spain. Still, immigration was a very rare phenomenon in Spain until the late
1990s. Additionally, some parents may have their kids obtain an ID number before they are 14. This
may be the case particularly after Spain entered in the mid 90s the Schengen zone and IDs became a
valid documentation to travel to a number of European countries. Still, individuals born around the
introduction of the Schengen zone were generally too young to participate in the public examinations
performed during 2002-2006.
29
table which assigns year of birth to the first four digits of ID number (ranges of 10,000
numbers). To test the precision of this correspondence, we apply it to a publicly available
list of 3,000 court secretaries, which contains both the ID number and the date of birth.
In 95% of the cases the assigned age is within a three year-interval of the actual age. In
order to minimize potential errors, whenever our age proxy indicated that a candidate to
associate professor is less than 27 years old and a candidate to full professor is less than
35 years old, we assign age a missing value (around 5% of the sample). The choice of
these thresholds is justified by survey information, according to which the minimum age
at which promotion to associate and full professor positions was granted in Spain before
2002 is respectively 27 and 35 (Cruz-Castro et al. 2006). Our proxy of age is not defined
for non-Spaniards (less than 1% of the sample). We imputed the missing information on
age assuming that individuals, for whom the age proxy is missing, have the same age as
an average individual of the same academic rank in the same discipline.
The Ministry provides information on affiliation for eligible evaluators. Given that
most candidates to full professor positions are themselves eligible evaluators in exams to
associate professor positions, it is possible to obtain their affiliation by matching the list of
eligible evaluators with the list of candidates. Using this procedure, we were able to obtain
the information on affiliation for 93% of candidates to full professor positions. Information
on affiliation at the time of the examination for the remaining 7% of candidates was
obtained from the State Official Bulletin or directly from professors’ CVs.
ISI Web of Science Information on scientific publications comes from Thompson ISI
Web of Science (WoS).21 WoS database includes over 10,000 high-impact journals in Sci-
ence, Engineering, Medicine and Social Sciences, as well as international proceedings
coverage for over 110,000 conferences. Out of these ten thousand journals, approximately
two hundred are edited in Spain. For the purpose of this analysis, we considered all arti-
cles, reviews, notes and proceedings. We collected information on publications since 1975
by authors based in Spain. As well, we consider citations received by these publications
21We are grateful to the Fundacio´n Espan˜ola para la Ciencia y la Tecnolog´ıa for providing us with
access to the data.
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before July 2012.
The assignment of articles to professors is non trivial. For each publication and
author, WoS provides information on the surname and on the initial (or, in some cases,
initials). Homonymity problems may arise in the case of common surnames (i.e. Garcia,
Fernandez, Gonzalez). Moreover, unlike most countries, in Spain individuals typically
use two surnames (paternal and maternal) and sometimes also a middle name. A paper
authored by a Spanish author may include only the paternal or the maternal surname,
or both surnames hyphenated. As well, Spanish authors may sign using their first name,
their middle name, or both.
We use the following matching procedure in order to identify authors. First, we match
publications with Spanish affiliations to professors using information on surnames and
initials. We select the subsample of publications that have a unique match in our list of
Spanish professors. This subsample includes 250,000 publications. Second, we use this
subsample to create a correspondence table between the 240 scientific areas used by ISI to
classify publications and the 190 scientific disciplines used by the Ministry of Education
in order to classify professors. Specifically, we assign the ISI area to a given discipline
(i) if the proportion of publications in the ISI area by professors from the discipline
exceeds 10% of the total number of publications in the discipline (or viceversa), or (ii) if
it appears before the 50% threshold in the cumulative distribution of publications ordered
by the decreasing importance of ISI areas in the discipline (or viceversa). The resulting
correspondence table, available upon request, allows matching publications in ISI areas
to the scientific areas defined by the Ministry of Education. On average, we assign five
ISI areas to each discipline. Finally, using this correspondence table, we merge the ISI
publication data with the full list of professors using information on surnames, initials
and discipline.
If a given publication can be assigned to more than one possible match, the value
of this publication is divided by the number of such possible matches. Less than 3% of
publications were assigned to more than one individual. This figure is equal to 0.5% in the
subsample of individuals with “less common surnames”, i.e. individuals whose maternal
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and paternal surnames have a frequency below 100,000 according to the Spanish National
Statistical Institute.
Given that propensity to publish differs substantially across disciplines, we normalize
the number of individual’s publications to have zero mean and unit standard deviation
among applicants to the same exam and among eligible evaluators of a given category
in a given exam. The number of citations of each publication depends on time elapsed
between the publication date and the date when the number of received citations is ob-
served. Therefore, we first normalize the number of citations received by each publication
subtracting the average number of citations received by Spanish-authored articles pub-
lished in the corresponding ISI disciplinary area in the same year and then dividing by
the corresponding standard deviation. Next, for each individual in our database we calcu-
late the average number of normalized citations per publication. Finally, similarly to the
number of publications, we re-normalize the number of individual’s citations per publica-
tion to have zero mean and unit standard deviation among applicants to the same exam
and among eligible evaluators of a given category in a given exam. We treat individuals
who have no ISI publications as if they had received zero citations.
TESEO database on doctoral dissertations Since 1977 PhD candidates in Spanish
universities register their dissertation in the database TESEO, which is run by the Min-
istry of Education. We retrieved all the information available in this database from the
website https://www.educacion.gob.es/teseo in May 2011. We observe 151,483 dis-
sertations. TESEO provides the identity and affiliation of dissertations’ authors, advisors
and committee members.
We are able to find the dissertation of 83% of candidates to AP exams. Missing
information may be due to the fact that (i) individuals did their PhD abroad, (ii) they
defended their dissertation before 1977, (iii) there are spelling mistakes, (iv) there was a
homonymity problem (0.1% of individuals share the same name, middle name, paternal
surname and maternal surname) or (v) the dissertation was not included in TESEO for
unknown reasons.22 We use dissertation information to identify candidates’ alma mater.
22While registration is compulsory, according to Fuentes and Arguimbau (2010), TESEO does not
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Connections We define different types of connections between candidates and eval-
uators. First, we consider strong professional connections that imply interaction on a
common piece of research, c′1: advisor-student relationship and co-authors. These two
types of connections are highly intertwined in Spain: around 50% of individuals have
co-authored a paper with their advisor. We use information from ISI on individuals’
publication record to identify whether candidates and evaluators have co-authored a pa-
per. In the case when an author of a publication can be assigned to more than one
possible match, the co-authorship tie is given a weight equal to the inverse of the num-
ber of possible matches. Second, we identify institutional connections, c′2. In the case
of FP exams, we consider that the evaluator and the candidate have an institutional
connection if at the time of the examination they are colleagues at the same university.
Unfortunately we cannot observe the affiliation of candidates to AP positions at the time
of the exam, we only observe the institution where they obtained their PhD. In this case
we consider that the evaluator and the candidate have an institutional connection if the
candidate obtained her PhD from the university where the evaluator is based. Given the
low geographical mobility of Spanish professors at this stage (Cruz-Castro et al. 2006),
it seems reasonable to presume that the large majority of candidates to AP positions
were still based in their alma mater at the time of the evaluation. Third, we identify the
following weak ties between candidates and evaluators, c′3, which imply some professional
interaction: the evaluator was a member of the candidate’s thesis committee; the evalu-
ator has invited the candidate to sit on the thesis committee of one of her students (or
vice versa); the evaluator and the candidate sat on the same thesis committee. Finally,
we identify several indirect ties between candidates and evaluators, c′4: the evaluator and
the candidate have either a common advisor or a common thesis committee member or
a common co-author.
We attribute only one type of connection to a given pair of individuals, following the
priority order introduced above. Specifically, given that the co-authorship link is defined
include information on approximately 10% of all dissertations read in Spain.
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probabilistically, we apply the following transformation:
c1 = c
′
1 c3 = (1− c2)c′3
c2 = (1− c1)c′2 c4 = (1− c3)c′4




4 ∈ [0, 1].
Appendix B: Expected Committee composition
In exams to FP positions, the expected number of connections in the committee is
essentially equal to the proportion of connections in the pool of eligible FPs times seven
(as there are seven evaluators in the committee). However, as explained in footnote
11, the random assignment of evaluators to committees was subject to a constraint:
every committee could include at most one researcher from the Spanish Research Council
(CSIC) and one emeritus professor. When a second individual belonging to one of these
categories was drawn, the draw was not considered. Therefore, in exams where the
population of potential evaluators contains two or more researchers, or two or more
emeritus professors, the expected number of connections in the committee should be
computed taking into account this constraint. This affects 387 of 967 exams.
First, we compute the probability that at least one researcher is drawn from the pool,












) , pE = 1− (E0)(P+R7−0 )(P+E+R
7
)
where R is the number of researchers in the pool, E is the number of emeritus professors
and P is the number of eligible professors who are not emeritus. Once these probabilities
are computed, it is possible to calculate for each candidate the expected number of
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connections in the committee:
µ =pRpE(cR + cE + 5cP ) + pE(1− pR)(cE + 6cP )
+ pR(1− pE)(cR + 6cP ) + (1− pR)(1− pE)7cP
where cj indicates the number of connections in group j and j ∈ {R,E, P}.
In AP exams, three evaluators are drawn from the pool of eligible FPs, and then four
evaluators are drawn from the pool of eligible APs. The expected number of connections
in the committee is generally equal to the proportion of connections among FPs times
three plus the proportion of connections among APs times four. Again, in order to take
into account the constraint on the randomization, analogously to the case of FP exams, we
compute the probabilities that at least one researcher and at least one emeritus professor
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E ). Then we compute the expected









P ) + p
FP
E (1− pFPR )(cFPE + 2cFPP )
+ pFPR (1− pFPE )(cFPR + 2cFPP ) + (1− pFPR )(1− pFPE )3cFPP ]
+ [(1− pFPR )(1− pFPE )[pAPR pAPE (cAPR + cAPE + 2cAPP ) + pAPE (1− pAPR )(cAPE + 3cAPP )
+ pAPR (1− pAPE )(cAPR + 3cAPP ) + (1− pAPR )(1− pAPE )4cAPP ]
+ pFPR (1− pFPE )[pAPE (cAPE + 3cAPP ) + (1− pAPE )4cAPP ]
+ pFPE (1− pFPR )[pAPR (cAPR + 3cAPP ) + (1− pAPR )4cAPP ] + pFPE pFPR 4cAPP ]
where ckj is the proportion of connections in the pool of k ∈ {FP,AP} professors belonging
to group j ∈ {R,E, P}.
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